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In Latin America the last 30 years have seen enormous strides in the measurement of 
inequality and poverty at the national (and subnational) level and in the feasibility of 
making meaningful comparisons across countries and over time in the same country. Latin 
America is around the norm for developing countries as a whole in this regard; the 
availability and accuracy of its data is better than in some other regions but weaker than in 
others. It now permits reasonable guesses as to the true level of inequality in most countries 
of the region, makes it clear that inequality is higher in some than in others and, usually with 
less confidence, allows some judgments on trends. The regional distinctions are basically 
more feasible than the over time judgments, because the observed variance is several times 
higher; thus the reported Gini coefficient in Brazil is usually around 0.60 and that in 
Uruguay is around 0.40,1 so the likelihood that non-comparability of estimates would 
negate the conclusion that inequality is much greater in Brazil than in Uruguay is extremely 
remote. Over time it is rare to see the reported Gini coefficient for a given country vary by 
more than 0.04-0.05, so if the error of estimate changed considerably over the period of that 
change, it is less assured that a true change did occur. Reported changes of up to about 0.05 
in the Gini coefficient make it necessary to attach a probability statement to any surmise as 
to whether a change really occurred. Such caveats notwithstanding, our knowledge has 
 
increased greatly, both about the level of inequality per se, its components (e.g. how much is 
associated with inequality of labor income) and various of its correlates, and with respect to 
the nature of the remaining measurement errors. The fact that reported inequality tends to be 
very stable in most countries, in the absence of identifiable changes in measurement (e.g. in 
the nature of the questions asked in the surveys) suggests that true inequality is also stable. 
The main possible exception to this generalization is that overall measurement error could 
change over time in a way closely related to changes in true capital income distribution 
and/or true capital share; thus reported capital income and its impact on reported inequality 
might not change while true capital income and true overall distribution did. Such a change 
might result from financial liberalization, frequently argued to have contributed to rising 
inequality in developing countries (Cornia, 2004; Behrman et al, 2000). 
 
What are the remaining weaknesses in the measurement of inequality and what do we lose 
as a result? Inequality data are used in part for broad descriptive purposes like those just 
alluded to. To this end they are now reasonably satisfactory for most countries of the region. 
They are also used to assess overall economic performance (e.g. did inequality rise or fall in 
the last decade?) and as evidence on the impact of specific policies (e.g. did inequality fall 
when a new pension system was implemented?). For this purpose, the quality is not nearly 
so adequate since much greater precision is required if one is to be in a position to identify 
relatively small changes in overall inequality or more specific changes (e.g. related to 
certain subgroups within the population). Few changes either in policy or in the mechanisms 
of the development process are likely to affect the Gini coefficient by more than a couple of 
percentage points, which is clearly well within the normal error of estimate of reported to 
 
real Gini. To have a chance to detect impacts on inequality one must therefore have a good 
idea of the likely serial correlation of the errors of observation. Fortunately, there is good 
reason to believe that such correlation will tend to be high, so this provides a reasonable 
chance to identify impacts. Chances of such identification are also raised by the fact that 
many policies are expected to influence only certain groups within the overall population 
and with adequate detail the income of these groups can be traced. 
 
The extent of poverty, as it is traditionally conceived in economics, may be thought of as 
implicit in the evidence on average income and its distribution or average consumption and 
its distribution, depending on whether poverty is defined in income or in consumption 
terms. Thus all of the measurement issues that affect that part of the distribution not too far 
above the poverty line are relevant to the discussion of poverty as well as to that of 
inequality. The one additional issue relating to poverty is where to draw the line or lines. 
We do not address that complicated question here, beyond noting that one reason that it is 
important to have a clear picture of most of the income or consumption profile in a country 
is precisely that there is always a degree of arbitrariness in where poverty lines are drawn. 
Poverty conclusions are most persuasive when they are not very sensitive to where the 
poverty line(s) are drawn. 
 
In the remainder of this paper we first review the state of information on inequality/poverty 
in Latin America (Section 2), then consider the main gaps that it would be desirable to fill in 
light of the major policy issues most urgently needing to be addressed (Section 3). Since this 
latter list of priorities is a matter of personal judgment, any conclusions draw with respect to 
 
priority improvements in the database are naturally by implication a matter of judgment as 
well. A few brief conclusions on priorities are presented in Section 4. 
 
Measurement Weaknesses, their Relative Importance and the Feasibility of 
Addressing Them 
 
Distribution of private income and private consumption 
In most developing countries, estimates of inequality of private income and private 
consumption can now be based on periodic household surveys taken annually or more 
frequently. So frequency of data points is much less a problem than it was a few decades 
ago. In some parts of the world the main focus is on measuring consumption, in others 
(including Latin America) on measuring income. It is desirable to have both these 
distributions; which is more important to know with precision depends, among other things, 
on which policy issues it is most important to analyze. If one knows one of them with 
reasonable precision it is possible to guess at the other one with a certain degree of success. 
It is accepted that the distribution of consumption (or of total expenditure) can be more 
accurately measured than the distribution of income; this can be a factor in the choice of 
which distribution to focus on. It may even be that the best way to get a good feel for the 
distribution of income is to begin with a good measure of the distribution of consumption, 
then use a variety of other information to map this distribution onto that of income. The best 
approach, of course is to strive for accurate measurement of both, and to use non-survey 
information to crosscheck the relationship between the two. The greater potential accuracy 
of measurement of consumption and its distribution comes with a higher minimum cost of 
 
eys.  
data collection, since it is necessary to have a quite detailed questionnaire.2 As a result 
many countries perform these surveys with less frequency than the income surv
 
Household surveys allow the analyst to focus on the distribution of income among earners, 
among families ranked by per capita or total income, or among persons ranked by per capita 
family income. Per capita measures may be improved a little by using per adult-equivalent 
variables. If data on both consumption and on income are collected, it is possible to identify 
the functional relationship between savings and income. Typically household surveys fail to 
incorporate publicly provided goods and services (public consumption) and may or may not 
take account of most taxes and transfers, and thus must be considered to provide only part of 
the whole distributional story.  
 
Apart from their failure to capture the impact of the public sector on distribution, household 
surveys suffer from a set of common and predictable measurement problems, whose 
resolution or not determines the accuracy of the information collected. These include: 
i) imprecision of the income data for most self-employed groups, especially those 
in activities where gross income varies considerably over time, where the 
calculation of net income requires subtracting out various inputs, and where the 
informant does not keep books. Most small agriculture fits into this category, but 
the problems are accentuated there by the long-run seasonal fluctuations and the 
usually higher cost of data collection due to distance; 
ii) weak data on high income recipients, especially those whose earnings come 
mainly from capital. Many such people have complicated earnings structures; 
 
this is compounded by a reluctance to report income fully through fear of taxes 
or other negative consequences. 
iii) weak data on income in kind, especially prevalent in small-farm agriculture, 
raises special difficulties since the earner often does not think of it as income at 
all, and even after being pressed to provide the relevant information, may be 
hampered by the fact that no market price is attached to the outputs involved. 
Imputed rent on owner-occupied housing is an important form of income in kind, 
especially for urban dwellers. Not all surveys include estimates of it, but it is less 
difficult to approximate reasonable numbers than for some other forms of 
income in kind, since the characteristics of a dwelling are observable and the 
owner may know roughly how much it would cost to rent such a dwelling. This 
element of income is increasingly, but by no means always, included in surveys. 
iv) weak data on illegal income, which may reach significant levels in some 
countries. People who have to pay protection probably seldom report it as an 
expenditure nor do those who receive it report it as income. In this respect crime-
related and other illegal forms of income are like some components of capital 
income. 
 
The above weaknesses have been expressed as the result of inaccurate or incomplete 
responses by households who are captured in the survey. A different problem arises when 
households refuse to participate in the survey or are not at home/not easily locatable. This 
“unit non-response” problem is also very unlikely to be uncorrelated with income and other 
relative variables, and hence adds another type of bias to reported figures. Mistiaen and 
 
Ravallion’s (2003) analysis of US data leads them to conclude that correction for this bias 
appreciably increases mean income and inequality, as a result of decreasing compliance as 
income rises.3 Though they see no presumption that their results, even in qualitative terms, 
will hold elsewhere, the finding of a significant impact for the US makes it highly probable 
that differential compliance has some sort of impact in many developing countries. It thus 
increases the likely magnitude of error in reported figures on inequality. 
 
As a result of the various weaknesses and challenges noted, the most reliable information in 
household surveys comes from those individuals on fixed salaries, a datum easy both to 
remember and to verify. The main contours of many reported income distributions are 
dominated by the incomes of these mainly middle class people. Altimir (1998, 48, 76) sums 
up the distribution data for Latin America noting that the income data usually refer to 
household disposable cash income, after direct tax payments. “Income in kind and imputed 
income….is either explicitly excluded or so poorly measured as to be considered excluded 
in most of the surveys,…. which are labor or income surveys.” In light of the severity of 
reporting problems for major groups, it is not surprising that it may be necessary to resort to 
consumption data to get a better feel for distribution. Individuals are less reluctant to report 
such data, and it is conceptually simpler than income data, even if it is necessary to collect 
data on a long list of items, some of which are purchased only infrequently. It is implicit in 
the above observations that consumption data are especially important in learning about the 
incomes of agricultural earners, informal sector workers and higher income people, given 
the difficulty of approaching income measurement directly. 
 
 
How serious are the above weaknesses, relative to each other and to absolute accuracy? This 
depends most directly on the policy issue for which the data are needed, but also on the 
economy, its structure and its level of development, as well as on the quality of the data 
collection process. In still very agricultural economies, the problems of measuring home-
consumption are great and failure to get a reasonable reading on this component means 
missing a significant share of income, especially in the case of poor subsistence farmers. 
Even if only a few percent of GDP were involved, it would be easy to understate the 
incomes of the bottom decile or so by 20-40% in this way. This could make a great 
difference to estimates of poverty and the poverty gap in rural areas. With agriculture and 
rural populations declining in Latin America, and with subsistence agriculture also less and 
less common, this problem has also been declining in relative importance. But since, 
according to existing figures, a third of the poor and nearly half of the very poor (indigent) 
are still found in rural areas (CEPAL, 2004, 50) it remains important. The measurement 
problems among workers in the informal sector, where errors of 25-50% for many 
individuals are quite possible, are of increasing relative importance given the trend towards 
informalization of the urban economy that has accompanied the slow growth in most 
countries over the last quarter-century. As with low-income agriculture, the measurement 
problem here takes on special importance because many people in the sector are poor. The 
largest chunk of national income typically missed in surveys is the capital and business 
income of high income earners. In a survey whose quality was such that 70-90% of paid 
labor income was reported, the figure for capital income might be as low as 20-30%; the 
reporting ratio for this income seldom appears to reach 50%, when the benchmark or point 
of reference for the estimate is the national accounts figure. Imputed income from owner-
 
occupied housing is the easiest large component of capital income to measure; most other 
components are difficult. 
 
Estimates of income and consumption underreporting in household surveys4 are themselves 
subject to much uncertainly in most countries of Latin America because the accuracy of the 
national accounts figures, the only overall source of a feasible cross-check for the household 
survey data, appears to vary widely also, and there is typically little independent evidence to 
go on to judge how seriously they may be in error. Most observers assume the bias is 
typically downward, which means that estimated measurement error in household surveys, 
when based on a comparison with the national accounts, will also tend to be downward 
biased. Ideally, one should compare each of consumption, savings, and income from the 
household surveys with the corresponding figures from the national accounts, bearing in 
mind that in some cases the national accounts figures make use of the household survey data 
in their construction. One may therefore have a true cross-check between independent 
estimates of the same economic variable only for some components of each of these three 
variables. Completeness of reporting for some household surveys can be partially assessed 
by comparing them to others taken at nearly the same time and having higher quality 
standards. Average underreporting of income in household surveys can sometimes be 
deduced up to a point by comparison with consumption figures from the same survey; if the 
comparison implies an implausibly low savings rate or high dissavings rate, this suggests 
income underreporting. Aggregate savings and some of its components may be 
approximated in other ways also, in particular with financial system data; these can provide 
a useful crosscheck for both the household survey and the national accounts estimates, 
 
though the latter are sometimes based in part on such data. In short, the accuracy with which 
income and consumption distribution can be ascertained depends on the total body of 
information available, some of which provides direct evidence and some provides 
crosschecks of various sorts. In some countries very little data is available to permit useful 
cross-checks (e.g. where the national accounts are not very reliable, financial information is 
scarce, etc.) whereas in others (most notably India) much good work has been done to 
compare survey data with other sources and thus narrow down the range of uncertainty. 
Though in principle the whole body of data useful to undertake such crosschecks should be 
thought of as the information base for analysis of inequality, very few studies have taken 
full advantage of it. 
 
Capital incomes constitute in many ways the biggest challenge in the measurement of 
inequality, though not of poverty since poor people usually have little income of this sort; 
they are especially hard to measure with reasonable accuracy either as part of the national 
accounts exercise or in household surveys. In the former context they are typically derived 
as a residual between national income accruing to the private sector and labor income. Two 
major problems are involved in that estimation. First, as a residual between two bigger 
numbers, the percent error which the estimate of capital income may suffer due to a modest 
error of estimate in one or both of the larger variables is great. Second, one is mainly 
interested in net capital income (i.e. after deprecation), but gross capital income is better 
measured in the national accounts since depreciation is a tricky concept, even in theory, and 
the simple accounting-type rules usually used to define it could be well off the target in 
some situations. Thus in trying to assess total net capital incomes, or net capital incomes 
 
accruing to individuals (total minus those remaining in the hands of corporations) one has to 
work with substantially inaccurate estimates from both sources. This is a major problem in 
analysis of distribution since capital shares do appear to be high in many developing 
countries, and they clearly constitute much of the income of the top few percentiles of the 
distribution. Cross country comparisons, especially of the top part of the distribution, could 
be seriously in error if, as must be expected, the completeness of reporting of this income 
component varies substantially from country to country. The reliability of over time 
analyses is also seriously prejudiced. This problem is of special relevance in Latin America, 
both because of the high observed levels of inequality and because the major factor 
contributing to the recent increase in reported inequality has taken place at the top of the 
distribution. Whether the increases in the share of the top few percent have been 
exaggerated or understated is an important issue from a welfare point of view and in terms 
of the social efficiency of growth. 
 
One relatively simple and frequent adjustment to correct for the relative underreporting of 
capital income involves adjusting reported capital income up by the same percent for each 
person (or family) reporting such income, that percent being based on the overall degree of 
relative underreporting of capital income based on comparison with the national accounts 
figures for each of labor and capital income. Altimir’s adjustments to estimated inequality in 
a number of Latin American countries to take account of this factor (see Table 10.1) are a 
variant of this approach. Broadly speaking, his procedure involved adjusting upward each 
type of income where the average amount reported in the surveys was less than that implicit 
in the national accounts, except for monetary property incomes where underreporting was 
 
assumed to be concentrated totally in the upper quintile (Altimir, 1987, 151-2). This 
adjustment increased the Gini coefficient by up to six percentage points in a number of 
cases but in others by very little. Altimir (1987, 146) notes that items like property income 
received in cash by households are likely to be grossly underestimated in the national 
accounts of some countries, and although there have been some improvements since he 
wrote, the broad picture is probably similar. Such weaknesses in the national accounts mean 
that the adjustment reported here probably still leaves most or all of the Gini coefficients 
below their true values.5 Only with the detailed study of capital incomes, and more 
generally the incomes of the top few percentiles of populations, will it be possible to 
achieve reasonably reliable estimates of overall inequality. Better household surveys will be 
part of that effort but need to be complemented by a battery of other types of information. 
Analysis of the economic conditions of the rich in developing countries require special 
effort, something along the lines of Kuznets (1953) path-breaking study for the US half a 
century ago. Although Latin America has a number of studies of rich families and how they 
got that way, for example Majul, (1997) for Argentina and Miranda (2000) for Paraguay, 
they do not take the sort of approach which would contribute to the quantitative 



















(a) National Level       
Brazil 1972 7.0 50.6 0.605 5.6 58.7 0.662 
Colombia 1972 5.9 50.8 0.618 6.5 50.1 0.607 
Mexico 1963 10.2 42.2 0.530 7.5 50.2 0.606 
 1968 10.6 42.1 0.521 8.1 48.3 0.586 
 1977 11.5 36.3 0.482 10.4 40.1 0.518 
Peru 1971/72 7.0 42.9 0.568 5.7 46.2 0.603 
Venzuela 1971 10.3 35.7 0.494 9.8 36.3 0.505 
        
(b) Urban Areas       
Argentina 1970 16.0 28.8 0.385 13.6 35.8 0.448 
Brazil 1972 8.6 47.0 0.569 6.3 54.8 0.633 
Colombia 1975 8.0 43.6 0.565 8.1 45.2 0.572 
Mexico 1968 11.7 40.1 0.498 9.3 45.4 0.553 
Peru 1971/72 12.2 36.3 0.471 11.6 38.8 0.489 
Uruguay 1967 14.3 30.5 0.419 13.3 35.7 0.454 
 
One form of income based on ownership of capital but not included in the national accounts 
(since it does not correspond to current production) is the appreciation or depreciation of 
assets. Since it does constitute part of people’s disposable income, for purposes of analysis 
of distribution it should be taken into account. In principle, therefore, it should be included 
in household surveys designed to measure inequality; in practice, high reporting errors 
might produce results of little value. It would be more plausible to pursue information on 
this component of income together with data on wealth distribution. I am unaware of studies 
in Latin America that have tried to incorporate this form of family income, either on the 
basis of evidence at the family level or based on some more indirect approach. The study of 
wealth distribution is in and of itself interesting (e.g. to link it to political power), but has 
additional merit as a way to improve the accuracy of all capital- related components of 
income distribution, especially capital gains. Wealth studies have been few in developing 
 
countries outside Asia, including those of Latin America (Davies and Shorrocks, 2005). 
 
Bhatia’s pioneering study for the US found that over the period 1948-1964 accrued capital 
gains on corporate stock, real estate and livestock were as much as 12% of reported personal 
income (Bhatia, 1972, 869). Realized capital gains were a much smaller 2.6%, but this is the 
less relevant figure. Of accrued gains, the bulk (60.6%) was from corporate stocks, 28.7% 
from nonfarm residential real estate and 12.6% from farm real estate. As expected, accrued 
gains were erratic, exceeding a quarter of regular personal income in a couple of years but 
turning substantially negative in some others. Pending comparable studies in Latin 
American countries, it seems plausible that the ratio of capital gains to production-related 
income may reach the 5-10% range or even higher in some of them. Including this element 
of income inevitably makes inequality more severe, since it is likely to be more or less 
proportional to wealth (or to other components of capital income), which is distributed in a 
way substantially more unequal than is income itself. Urbanization and stock market booms 
tend to increase the appreciation component of income. It is also substantially more volatile 
than other components, so in periods of general economic crisis, when the value of real 
estate, stocks, etc. tends to fall, overall income distribution including this factor will be less 
unequal than income excluding it. But in the long run it is an inequality-increasing factor. 
 
While income from sources like rent on capital, capital appreciation, or criminal activities is 
particularly unlikely to show up in survey figures on income, the consumption which it 
facilitates is much more likely to, hence data on consumption inequality may provide a 
valuable cross-check on that for income inequality. It is recognized that consumption 
 
inequality is less than that of income by several Gini percentage points.6 Unfortunately 
consumption surveys have not been sufficiently frequent in Latin America to permit enough 
analysis of the determinants of how income and consumption distributions differ to permit a 
sort of calibration which would allow fairly precise estimation of levels and trends in one of 
the two if one had only the other. 
 
 
The Distribution of Secondary Income: Handling Taxes and Transfers  
It is important, especially as the level of development advances, to distinguish income levels 
before and after taxes and (monetary) transfers. In-kind transfers have to be dealt with 
separately because of the special valuation problem they create. The primary distribution  
of income is that which emerges from the functioning of the economy before any subsequent 
redistribution through taxes and transfers: the secondary distribution includes their effects. 
Most income surveys focus just on current disposable income after any withholding of 
taxes, this being the easiest figure for the respondent to understand and provide. If income 
taxes must be paid on an annual basis they are no doubt often missed. In many countries 
such taxes are only paid by a minority of individuals in any case. Monetary transfers 
received from private or public sources tend to be caught, especially if they are regular. The 
impact of sales taxes is already taken account of since the prices used to deflate incomes 
include these taxes. The implication of these patterns is that the typical reported distribution 
is a combination of the before and the after tax and transfer monetary distributions, usually 
closer to the latter.  
 
 
Proper assessment of the overall impact of the tax and transfer system on income (or 
consumption) distribution requires a general equilibrium analysis. Such analyses are rare 
and difficult, especially with respect to the impact of the system on distribution through its 
effects on savings, investment and growth. The indirect effects of some transfers (e.g. 
pensions to low income people) may be relatively small, although even in such cases there 
may be a substitution effect for inter-family transfers and multiplier effects on local incomes 
where the money is spent. The broader question of how all public sector interactions with 
families affect distribution includes the impact of the provision of public services in kind to 
families, which requires a special analysis as noted below, and the impact of monetary 
subsidies and provision of public services in kind to businesses; since the first-round effects 
of these benefits from government show up in family incomes, they need no further 
consideration unless and until one attempts to estimate the general equilibrium effects of the 
public sector’s activities.7 
 
Publicly provided goods and services  
Judging by the few careful and relatively complete studies available, education, health and 
other public services, together with subsidies, often have significant impacts on the 
distribution of both income and consumption (publicly provided services are part of both 
income and consumption). Measurement of these benefits is less straightforward, or at least 
less reliable, than of benefits from transfers and losses through payment of taxes, because 
the decision on quantity and quality of the service available to a given person or family is 
made by the government rather than by the individual or family.8 The standard assumption 
is that benefits are distributed proportionately to cost of provision among those receiving 
 
“the same” service, with total benefits equaling total costs. That each recipient benefits 
equally will never be precisely true and may not be close to accurate; that total benefits 
equal total costs of provision may also be well off the mark in either direction. If one took 
literally some of the very high rate of return figures estimated for primary education, total 
benefits could be two or three times total costs. But benefits could also fall short of costs 
where quality is very defective. The degree of mismeasurement of the benefits from some 
services can be lowered through surveys including respondent judgments on relative or 
absolute value of those services. In the absence of anything to go on but total cost of 
provision, it is desirable to undertake some analysis to check for the sensitivity of overall 
inequality to the assumptions used.  
 
Selowksy’s (1979) study for Colombia was the first of the few thorough studies in Latin 
America to probe the impact of public spending on income distribution. Others have 
followed (e.g. Velez, 1996, Bravo et al, 2000) and an increasing number of countries 
(including Argentina, Colombia, Costa Rica and Ecuador) have used special modules in 
their household surveys to identify the destination of some public expenditures.9 The 
magnitude of the effort required for full-scale attacks on this problem make them infrequent, 
which complicates attempts to judge how distribution, duly including these goods and 
services, is changing. Hopefully the increasing use, widening scope and improved 
interpretation of household survey modules recording some important types of public 
spending will gradually fill in much of this gap in our understanding. Efforts are needed to 
find fairly reliable proxies for the distribution of public expenditure benefits, calibrated on 
the basis of the infrequent detailed studies undertaken.  
 
 
What to do About Market Misinformation? 
As just noted, publicly provided goods and services complicate the measurement of 
income/consumption since the fact of consumption does not reflect the client’s judgment on 
benefits relative to costs. A somewhat similar issue arises when, although the consumer 
does choose to buy, he/she does so on the basis of misinformation about the product. For 
frequently purchased items it is legitimately assumed that the associated losses will be small 
and learning will be quick. This is less so in the case of infrequent purchases, especially of 
goods where advertising is misleading or good information is simply hard to obtain. The 
most extreme case of loss though misinformation is probably that of addictive substances, in 
which case after making the wrong decision the buyer is unable to reverse course and 
correct the error. Under such circumstances, high expenditures on an item (e.g. drugs) may 
be reflective of low levels of benefit rather than high. The issue here is related to but not 
identical to some raised by the happiness literature (see below). 
 
The inclusion of natural “goods” and “bads” 
All goods and services that are purchased are in principle included in national income, 
together with some of those home-produced and consumed items for which a market exists. 
But it is clear that human welfare is also affected by numerous other factors, many of which 
are free. Serious attempts to measure levels of welfare and the distribution of that welfare 
should thus take these other determinants into account when possible—things like weather, 
beauty of surroundings, effects of surroundings on health, and degree of economic 
insecurity. The inevitable (because of inherent difficulties) failure to do so means that our 
 
measures of income, consumption and their distribution may not correspond very closely to 
true levels of satisfaction and its distribution. Accordingly, comparison of income levels and 
distributions across countries or over time may not reflect with any precision how 
satisfaction levels and distribution differ across populations, and must therefore be treated 
with the appropriate level of caution. Although the general response to this problem is to 
simply ignore it and accept that we can only get at some of the presumed determinants of 
satisfaction, it is worth asking whether and when it may be partially corrected. This is the 
case when a “good” which is naturally available in one country or region or time period is 
absent in another, leading to the production and purchase of partial substitutes. An example 
is the use of insurance to buy economic stability. In an over time analysis of income and its 
distribution in a country in which insecurity rises, for example because of the way the 
economy is structured and functions, one may often legitimately conclude that after 
purchase of insurance which provides a partial protection against an insecurity which was 
not there before, people are still worse off than before on this specific account. In such a 
case it would be legitimate to subtract all expenditures for purchase of insurance from 
disposable income and from consumption as one compares current income and consumption 
with the levels before the threat of insecurity arose.10 Another important example is crime; 
even after the cost of protection from it (which enters the national accounts as a “good”), a 
society may be deemed to be worse off than it was before the crime arose. Such a case 
produces the irony, in comparisons across countries or over time, that a country or period 
with a proclivity to crime both suffers the direct loss from that crime and also pays the costs 
of curbing it, yet that cost enters the national accounts as a positive service (which it is vis a 
vis the benchmark situation of a still worse situation without the protection). With a few 
 
important phenomena of this sort, estimated incomes could be rising while the standard of 
living as perceived by people was falling. 
 
Most non-marketed “goods” or “bads” do not accrue equally to everyone and thus constitute 
another component of a more broadly defined inequality. The effects of crime tend to fall 
disproportionately on the poor, partly because they are naturally more vulnerable and 
sometimes because government-provided protection against crime is not distributed fairly. 
Most poor people cannot buy safety, since some public goods are differentially available by 
socio-economic class. Sickness is another typical feature of poverty, since it is closely 
associated with socio-economic context—lack of clean water, lack of sanitation facilities, 
vulnerability to disease through malnutrition, etc. AIDS, while afflicting all social classes, is 
a special scourge to the poor since they have less options for earning a living and protecting 
their children than do the better off. Certain types of mental illness have been noted to be 
prevalent in urban shantytowns where families live in overcrowded quarters, income is 
inadequate to the needs of the family and insecurity and stress contribute to such illness 
(Rogler, 1965, 1989). Children living in such settings are especially vulnerable to abuse 
from family members or others. 
 
Looking at Income Volatility, Long Run Average Income, and Wealth 
Almost everyone’s income changes over time, so point-of-time snapshots of inequality and 
poverty can be misleading. Income fluctuations are of particular importance to people and 
families who are poor at least some of the time, i.e. the fluctuations can pull them out of 
poverty or push them into it. Unfortunately, short and medium-run income fluctuations are 
 
notorious for some groups with high average poverty, most notably small farmers and 
lower-income people in the informal sector. Thus, both to understand the nature of poverty 
as it afflicts these groups and to design policy to alleviate it requires an understanding of the 
short and medium-run income dynamics of these groups. Such analysis, increasingly 
common in industrial countries over the last few decades, usually requires panel data to 
follow families over periods of a year to a few years. It allows a useful distinction between 
the chronically poor and the transitorily poor and a corresponding distinction, where 
appropriate, between policies to deal with their respective problems (Hulme and Shephard, 
2003; McKay and Lawson, 2003). Although panel features in household surveys in some 
Latin American countries date back several decades, their use has not been widely 
institutionalized, with the result that we know much less about poverty dynamics than we 
should.11 Such knowledge would be helpful in the framing of a number of policies, 
including most obviously some targeting programs designed to alleviate poverty (see 
below). In fact, the informational needs of targeting programs have enriched the body of 
information on income distribution through the surveys and analyses undertaken, beginning 
with Chile’s CASEN program (MIDEPLAN, 1990) and replicated in several other countries 
of the region. 
 
Apart from income fluctuations that can quickly change a family’s relative position in the 
income hierarchy and/or its poverty status, there are longer-run trends that also change 
relative positions in the hierarchy and imply that inequality measured over longer periods 
differs from point of time inequality. Most people agree that one should be more interested 
in inequality of long run average income or consumption across people or families than in 
 
short-run inequality. Both logic and empirical evidence suggest that longer-run inequality 
tends to be moderately less than short-run inequality.12 This finding seems to be of only 
modest policy importance per se, however, since it seems unlikely that large cross-country 
differences or over time changes in short-term inequality would not be fairly faithfully 
reproduced in the corresponding longer-term figures. Too little analysis has been done in 
this area to allow any guesses for the developing countries, including those in Latin 
America. The sorts of panel data which are necessary to do this sort of analysis properly, are 
virtually never available for representative samples of populations over more than a year. In 
their absence, however, there is often considerable advantage to be gained by using the 
social security registers, which allow the tracking of a person's earnings over long periods of 
time. These are most likely to be useful in those countries where the labor force is relatively 
formalized, such as Argentina, Uruguay, Chile and Costa Rica, but are valuable in many 
others as well. In keeping with the general need to use different sources in a complementary 
way, the body of information deserves more attention than it has received. 
 
Wealth is an important determinant both of current and of future income, so knowing a 
family’s wealth level adds to one’s picture of its welfare, both because wealth affects future 
income and (related) because it serves as a source of economic security (Schneider, 2004, 
5). Wealth inequality, regardless of the definition employed,13 tends to be far greater than 
income inequality. Wolf (1996) reports 1980s Gini coefficients of 0.69-0.79 for Canada, 
France and the US and data for several other countries suggesting Gini’s in that same range 
while the estimates for Italy, Japan and Korea are lower, at around 0.60 (Schneider, 2004, 
51-52). Wealth inequality seems to have declined significantly over the longer run (a 
 
century or more) in each of the industrial countries (US and a few European nations) for 
which estimates are available. Wealth distribution in Latin America has received very little 
quantitative analysis. This is in rather striking contrast to the situation of the larger Asian 
countries, India, Chain and Indonesia, all of which have useful data (Davies and Shorrocks, 
2005). 
 
Allowing for Differences in/Changes of the Price Vector 
Levels of and changes in inequality are easiest to measure when all families at all of the 
points of time compared face the same relative prices for the items they purchase. Since this 
condition is rather far from being met, especially in the case of comparisons between quite 
unlike countries or over longer periods of time, considerable misinterpretation can result 
from failure to confront the problem. For point of time estimates of inequality in a given 
country the issue is partly one of inter-regional or inter socio-economic group price 
differences, and an increasing number of studies do address it, most often by using regional 
price data or a broad urban vs. rural distinction, or a combination of these.14 The use of 
differing price vectors may improve accuracy of estimates a great deal in situations where 
higher incomes (e.g. in certain urban areas) are mainly or wholly a response to/reflection of 
higher prices. Unfortunately where decisions on spatial location are heavily influenced by 
intangibles (or, more specifically, things which are not purchased), such deflation may 
actually diminish the accuracy of inequality estimates, since higher prices may often be 
correlated with the presence of such intangibles. While it is possible to use earnings 
differentials together with price differentials to make estimates of the relative value of such 
intangibles in different regions, it would be unrealistic to expect such refinement in any but 
 
the most in depth analyses of inequality. 
 
Because the composition of consumption is substantially different as between poorer people 
and richer people, it is possible that differences across countries in the distribution of 
income or consumption, or changes over time in the same country, will not correspond to 
differences in (changes in) real income or consumption. This factor is too seldom taken into 
account either in inter-group or region cross-country or over time comparisons although in 
principle it is relatively easy to do. It is probable that differences (or trends) in real income 
inequality would differ measurably from differences in (changes in) current-price income 
inequality whenever there are significant changes in relative prices. Poor families spend up 
to 70-80% of their total consumption on food, most of that on a few staples. The rich have a 
very different consumption bundle, including cars, tourism, and other luxury goods and 
services. Distribution in real terms worsens relative to distribution in nominal terms when a 
famine sharply raises the price of staples (Ravallion, 1987, Dreze, 1999). Less extreme but 
still substantial changes in relative prices have occurred in some countries during the 
process of liberalization. In cases where staple food prices were previously controlled and 
subsidized while luxury imports (and the components for them) paid hefty tariffs, 
liberalization would be expected to lower the relative price of the rich family consumption 
basket vis a vis that of the poor family. Use of current price data would thus lead to an 
underestimate of the increase (overestimate of the decrease) in inequality associated with 
the liberalization. 
 
Some countries officially produce more than one consumer price index, e.g. one for white 
 
collar workers and one for blue collar workers (a lengthy Colombian tradition). Even when 
this is not done, the consumption basket of various income groups is available from 
consumption surveys and can be used to develop separate price indices for as many groups 
as deemed appropriate. Meanwhile, cross-country studies in real terms can be facilitated 
through use of the purchasing power parity database on prices for a large number of 
countries around the world. In short, it is somewhat surprising that so little attention has 
been addressed to this possibly significant aspect of inequality differences and changes. 
 
Getting closer to the measurement of satisfaction or welfare 
An unjust or unfair society could legitimately be defined as one in which either welfare or 
the potential for (access to) welfare is quite unevenly distributed. In recognition of the fact 
that the study of inequality should in principle not be restricted to the more clearly economic 
elements of welfare, a number of authors have addressed the question of just how strong or 
weak the links between income and welfare are. A major body of data has been collected on 
people’s reported level of satisfaction or happiness and its correlates. The responses of 
people in the industrial countries (where such surveys have been carried out with some 
frequency and over long periods) about their happiness and its correlates indicate a much 
smaller role for income than standard economic theory would suggest. It is moderately 
significant when the comparison is between people at different levels of the income hierarchy 
at a point of time but less so--some authors say virtually insignificant, as a factor in how 
average societal welfare changes over time, even when average incomes have risen 
considerably (Easterlin, 1974, 1995; Scitovsky, 1976; Oswald, 1997). Most such studies reveal 
that the strongest influence among economic variables comes from employment; people with 
 
jobs are much happier than those without them.15 Low inflation also makes people feel 
happier. The educated are on average happier than the uneducated, the self-employed than 
employees, and the retired than the economically active. The precise meaning of most of this 
evidence remains to be drawn out; in particular a deeper understanding of the small apparent 
role of income cries out for analysis.16 So do the differences in results across countries whose 
economies and societies contrast in interesting ways.  
 
One might plausibly guess that income would be a more significant determinant of self-
reported happiness in lower income (developing) countries, and most of the available data does 
tend to confirm this.17 Frank (1997, 1834) notes that "most careful studies find a clear time-
series relationship between subjective well-being and absolute income at low levels of absolute 
income." Where most people lack minimally adequate shelter and nutrition, additional income 
yields significant and lasting improvements in subjective well-being (Diener and Diener, 
1995). Reported satisfaction levels are markedly lower in extremely poor countries than in rich 
ones, and within countries the positive link between income and satisfaction is significant 
primarily at the lowest levels of relative income. "For individuals in the middle and upper 
portions of the income distribution, variations in income explain less than 2% of variation in 
reported satisfaction levels" (Frank, 1997, 1834-5, citing Diener and Diener, 1995). Having 
concluded that average satisfaction levels within a country are not significantly correlated with 
income over time, Frank puts great emphasis on relative status as a source of respect and a 
determinant of well-being. 
 
The surprising (to many economists at least) findings on the relative unimportance of income 
 
as a determinant of societal welfare is only one of several reasons for a reconsideration of the 
conceptual basis for poverty policy. The role of a sense of belonging to a community in human 
welfare is obvious at one level, but it remains to be factored into discussions of economic 
policy. The same may be said of "social capital" (the ability to work effectively with others). 
Participatory poverty assessments uncover some of the correlates of welfare and deprivation as 
experienced by the respondents. In his study in the Republic of Guinea Shaffer. (1998) found 
that, although consumption data revealed no relative deprivation of women vis a vis men, two 
other dimensions which disproportionately affect women surfaced clearly—excessive 
workload and lack of decision-making authority/respect. Graham and Felton (2005, 12) report 
that, in contrast to the United States and Europe where women are on average happier than 
men, the opposite is true in Latin America, perhaps due to unequal gender rights. 
 
In what is, to my knowledge, the most detailed analysis of the happiness evidence for Latin 
American countries, Graham and Felton (2005, 17) find that many of the patterns observed 
elsewhere hold up and that inequality in Latin America seems to make the poor (here the 
bottom two quintiles of people ranked by wealth) much less happy and the rich (the top 
quintile) moderately happier. Though the qualitative nature of the questions used to rank 
happiness make any quantification of these effects problematic, the authors consider these 
effects to be large. 
 
The combination of evidence to the effect that more income does make the individual better off 
than his counterparts with less income but that when everyone's income rises over time there is 
a much less than commensurate effect on average reported happiness is consistent with the 
 
general notion that people's welfare depends on relative status, which in modern societies is 
affected by relative income and consuming power. Given such attitudes, deprivation—the 
reason one is interested in poverty as a problem—can be alleviated mainly by reducing the 
degree of income inequality. But, as many authors have emphasized, a more basic implication 
of such a situation is that society is dysfunctional since, with satisfaction defined mainly in 
relative terms, there is no way to make everyone much better off. The gain of the low income 
person who is now closer in status to those above him is a loss to the latter, who can no longer 
enjoy the feeling of superiority which gave him satisfaction before. A society whose attitudes 
are less individualistic and competitive and more positively community or society-oriented has 
the chance to benefit much more from economic advance. In short, the empirical evidence, 
especially that from the industrial countries, suggests that attitudinal change may be more 
important than economic growth, and that without the former the latter may remain largely 
irrelevant. Although this is less true of the developing countries, to the extent that they replicate 
the attitudinal patterns of the rich countries it will become their problem too. A key objective of 
any society should be to reduce the "zero-sum" component of what gives people satisfaction. 
 
However important one considered economic inequality to be before taking account of the 
findings of the happiness literature, that importance is accentuated when it is taken into 
account. Inequality now matters not just because it implies low purchasing power for those 
towards the bottom of the income hierarchy, but also because the gap between them and 
those above them imposes an added psychological cost. From a measurement point of view 
this not only enhances the importance of having and using good quality data on income and 
consumption distribution, but also suggests the value of collecting information on other 
 
likely correlates of welfare18 and on attitudes to inequality and poverty, studying their 
correlates, etc. Sociologists have advanced a good way in this direction but their work needs 
to be drawn on more extensively by economists and applied more directly to choices of 
economic policy. In Latin America the existence for about a decade of the Latinobarometro 
happiness surveys (used by Graham and Felton, 2005) and their considerable richness of 
information should continue to generate useful insights and lead to expansion of the 
database in new directions. 
  
Key Policy Uses of Distribution Data: Implications for What is Needed 
 
Judgments as to the most important gaps to be filled or refinements to be made to the battery 
of statistics available on inequality and poverty should be made with reference to the policy 
issues on which such improvements might bear. Where policy changes are expected or 
argued to influence the degree of poverty at an aggregate level, then overall poverty figures 
of adequate quality and without undue delay will be important. And where the mechanisms 
of the expected impact imply differing effects on different groups, it is important to have 
data whose detail corresponds to and can throw light on those mechanisms. 
 
Hypotheses relating to inequality and poverty tend to originate in one of two distinct ways. 
One type begins with the desire to understand the impacts of certain policies or phenomena 
on inequality. Another begins with the observation that inequality has changed significantly 
in either direction, thus offering an especially useful laboratory from which to learn about 
the factors influencing it. Whereas the first type of analysis focuses on a given policy and 
 
tries to trace its impacts, the second by nature considers all policies that might have played a 
role in the observed change in inequality. The data needs tend to be somewhat different 
depending on which type of analyses is being undertaken. 
  
Where the hypothesis under consideration is a broad one (e.g. globalization has significantly 
worsened income distribution) good aggregate distribution data are a natural tool to help test 
it, but they are never sufficient by themselves since, given the inevitable presence of 
competing hypotheses, the overall data base is unlikely to be sufficient to sorting out their 
relative validity without complementary information. That complementary information can 
help to validate the hypothesis by tracing the phenomenon’s presumed impact on different 
groups of people, as a complement to the analysis of its overall impact on distribution. 
Sometimes the sort of data needed to assess whether the hypothesized mechanisms were in 
play are included as standard components of income distribution data sets. If the hypothesis 
relates to the impact of increasing educational levels, we have the advantage that 
educational level of the individual is almost always reported together with income. If the 
hypothesis relates to size of the firms in which people work, such information is sometimes 
available but more often not. Accordingly, some uses of distribution data call for special 
modules to be added to questionnaires in order to permit a tracing of the mechanisms under 
discussion. At a third level, most causal analyses involving distribution data need to be 
complemented by other, independent information, for purposes of cross-checking, adding 
essential items and so on, as per the examples below. 
 
Some policies would not be expected to affect overall income or distribution levels enough 
 
to have a detectable effect in the aggregate data. In such cases data on the incomes of 
specific groups, together with their place in the bigger distributional picture will be the key 
ingredient to the analysis. Sometimes what is needed is a good picture of income structure 
such that it is possible to deduce ex ante the likely impact of a policy change. Thus, to 
predict the impact of an improvement in the quality of primary education on distribution, 
one needs to know where in the distribution are the persons whose quality of education will 
be affected, and have some idea of what will happen as a result of their getting better 
education. 
 
Among approaches to identifying the impacts of policies on inequality and poverty a broad 
tradeoff exists between those which rely more heavily on the use of broad distribution data 
to test hypotheses and those which rely more heavily on subgroup income data plus 
complementary information. Consider, for example, the hypothesis that microcredit brings 
benefits to the poor by raising the productivity and incomes of the loan recipients. A first 
step in the validation of this hypothesis is to verify that the borrowers do see more income 
due to higher productivity in their enterprises. But such evidence would not by itself prove 
that the project helped the poor since there could be negative side effects of the loans on the 
businesses of the competitors of the loan recipients. It is more difficult to detect such side 
effects through direct investigation than to identify the positive effects on the presumed 
beneficiaries and hence difficult to estimate the net overall impact on the population. Here 
the availability of more general income distribution data is important. Where the policy or 
phenomenon under analysis is of a magnitude such that it might be expected to influence, 
say, the average incomes of several deciles towards the bottom of the distribution, those 
 
effects may be best tested for with data on the incomes of those deciles. Approaching 
validation this way, however, gets one into the “competing explanations” problem; if one 
cannot take account of other possible factors at work in determining trends in average 
income and its distribution, one falls victim to the “omitted variables” problem. The 
essential trade-off is thus between (i) the capacity to specify all major determinants of 
changes in income and its distribution well enough so that one does not have to trace the 
effects of the specific policy of interest at the microeconomic level to be reasonably sure 
they are taking place and producing the final observed effect on income and its distribution; 
and (ii) the generation of enough detail about the income structure of the population to be 
able to verify more directly the mechanisms of policy impact. Where, for whatever reason, it 
is not feasible to model the impacts either of the policy under analysis or of other causal 
factors well enough to be able to study them effectively through their final impacts on 
income and its distribution (e.g. where too little is known about the lags with which they 
appear after the policy goes into play) then extra distributional detail and complementary 
information on the mechanisms linking the policy to the final outcomes will have a higher 
payoff. The two approaches are by definition complementary to each other, since it is 
preferable to be able to use both, as well as substitutes, since neither can ever be perfect. But 
with a given level of resources available for the two together, there is always the question of 
what combination is most effective. 
 
Another complicated issue is the impact of market reforms on growth and inequality. As 
discussed in more detail below, the cross-country time-series approach to identifying the 
impact of the various reforms, individually and as a group, is unlikely to provide reliable 
 
results given the many ambiguities about the mechanisms connecting these changes to the 
outcomes, and especially about the time lags involved between policy change and outcome 
change. These complexities, together with the great difficulty in specifying in an 
econometrically manageable way the other elements in the puzzle, like ongoing technical 
change, makes such exercises very challenging, and unlikely to yield relatable results in the 
near future. It will therefore be important to have the needed combination of information on 
income structure and on other relevant variables so that the mechanisms hypothesized to 
connect liberalization and distributional outcomes can be traced in some detail. Exactly 
what data are needed on distribution is a matter for analysts to specify, but things like the 
distinction between earners connected to tradables production vs. those connected to non-
tradables production would be one obvious need. So, probably, would data on who is 
connected to firms of differing sizes and technologies. 
 
Major issues in recent times whose distributional implications are important include: 
i) the impact of the recent market-friendly economic reforms, with special attention 
to trade reforms; 
ii) agricultural development, especially in Africa; 
iii) the impact of changes in technology; 
iv) education and health policy; 
v) financial development and regulations on the financial system, including 
microfinance; 
vi) small and medium enterprise (SME) policy; 
vii) targeting of assistance to specific poor or vulnerable groups such as women, 
 
orphans, single-parent families, families afflicted by HIV/AIDS, or the elderly 
through food aid, pensions, or subsidies for school attendance; 
viii) privatization [part of (i) but often discussed separately]. 
 
Several of these phenomena are included both because it is important to know what their 
distributional impact may be but also because they are already hypothesized as candidates in 
explaining the marked increases in inequality which have plagued a number of the countries 
of the region at various points of time over the last quarter century. Attempts to unravel the 
role of the market-friendly reforms in that worsening serve as a useful example of what 
sort of information is needed, in the context of a probably complicated set of mechanisms. 
Of the several multicountry studies that have addressed this issue, the Interamerican 
Development Bank study (IDB, 1997) and Morley (2001) for ECLAC employed similar 
data and econometric analysis but reached somewhat different results. The former 
concluded that the main worsening of income distribution was in the 1980s, with no further 
significant increases in the 1990s, and that the reforms—including the trade reforms—
actually improved distribution in comparison with what it would otherwise have been as 
well as contributing to growth. Morley, working from the reform indices developed by the 
IDB authors but extending and improving them and applying a more thorough econometric 
analysis, concluded that the reforms had a modestly negative effect on distribution and a 
small positive impact on growth. Berry and associates’ (Berry, 1998) series of country case 
studies judged that the frequent timing coincidence between the reforms (mainly trade 
reform) and the associated opening up and worsening inequality suggested a causal 
relationship.19 Without much more detailed probing and comparison, it is not possible to 
 
sort out which of the existing studies, if indeed any of them, gets close to the facts of the 
matter. A prudent judgement might be that the truth probably lies between the Morley 
results (small negative impact on inequality) and a pessimistic reading of the Berry et al. 
results in which all or nearly all of the distributional worsening that coincided with the 
reforms was caused by them. In the latter case, the reforms could have accounted for 
increases in the Gini coefficient of up to five percentage points in a number of the 
countries—but not in all, so that the average impact would be perhaps half that much.  
 
Successful analysis of this issue would require both better distribution data, better 
complementary data on other variables (like the reform indices used20), better capacity to link 
income status of individuals and families to the hypothesized mechanisms (e.g. employment in 
production of tradables or nontradables, size and technology of employing firm), and more 
total effort to probe competing hypotheses, allow for differences across countries in the 
mechanisms involved, etc. Among the weaknesses in the distribution data per se have been 
ambiguity in several countries (including Colombia and Chile) as to which time series on 
inequality to use, and the twin weaknesses of serious underreporting of capital income and the 
very limited analysis of the impact of changing relative prices on real inequality. Both of these 
flaws create a serious possibility that the impact of the reforms was more negative than any 
of the studies has concluded, especially in the light of the findings reported by Cornia and 
Court (2001) on the role of interest income in observed increases in inequality in several 
developing countries.  
 
Support for Small Agriculture 
 
It has been widely argued that a productive small-scale agriculture is a key to equitable 
growth and development (Johnston and Clark, 1982). Most calculations show land 
productivity to be a more or less monotonically decreasing function of farm size 
(Binswanger, Deininger and Feder, 1995; Lipton, 1993). Several authors note, however, that 
in many settings farms below a certain size are not sustainable so their operators eventually 
have to sell and go out of the business (Zimmerman and Carter, 2003). So is a land reform 
that breaks large farms into smaller units good for distribution and for poverty reduction or 
not? When can good support programs for small farms make the difference? Is their success 
related closely to the system of property rights and if so which systems are the best?21 The 
ideal battery of information with which to address this set of issues would include: 
unusually good income and consumption surveys—they must be of above average quality to 
hope to get reliable information on the people in a sector where income is erratic and the 
economics of the business often complicated; good data on the agricultural activities of 
families, of the sort usually collected in agricultural censuses, with the potential to link this 
data to the income and consumption data usually provided by household surveys, and which 
includes the income from non-agricultural activities. The data base should also include 
information on property rights, access to support services, and quality of relevant 
infrastructure. Data on land distribution and how it is changing are also important, together 
with income and production data over a period of time sufficient to permit identification of 
trends, and (very important) data on the non-agricultural incomes of families engaged in 
agriculture. Some data sets are satisfactory for part of this list of needs, but it is rare to be 
able to merge agricultural census type information with the other variables. 
 
 
Technological Change  
It is arguable that the most negative factor in the increasing inequality witnessed in many 
developing countries over the last few decades has been the nature of the technological 
change impinging on them, with the arrival of the new information and communication 
technologies (ICT) and the dramatic spread of supermarkets being two of the most obvious 
components of the process. Broadly speaking, the premature arrival of inappropriately 
capital-intensive technologies is an important aspect of the process, perhaps even more so 
than when the concept became popular in development thinking in the 1970s (Stewart, 
1977, Singer, 1982). The mechanisms and pace of technological change are associated in 
various ways with international economic integration--for example foreign direct investment 
plays a role, but the details are not well enough understood to permit reliable predictions as 
to when this process will be severely damaging to inequality and poverty and when it will 
not. Though there has been considerable research around the ICT technologies (Perez, 1994; 
Lall, 2004), very little has focused adequately on following the links whereby the new 
technology interfaces with inequality and poverty, except perhaps through the work on 
formal sector-informal sector and firm size relationships. Within Latin America it is a strong 
hypothesis that the widening productivity gaps by firm size (Peres and Stallings, 2000) have 
had a significant impact on income distribution through their impacts on different segments 
of the labor force, but little research has attempted to trace the chain of effects from newer 
technology through the productivity changes by groups of firms (e.g. categorized by size or 
type of technology) to the earnings of individual workers and their families. The modeling 
exercise carried out years ago by Adelman and Robinson (1978) for Korea exemplifies one 
useful approach. Sometimes the technology choice will be the result of or co-caused with 
 
other patterns, such as the distribution of land rights. In such cases it is likely that the only 
way to identify the major sources of changes in inequality and poverty is very detailed 
country studies which use as a main source of information household surveys with 
inequality data, but also use a wide range of complementary information (here on 
technologies employed, among other things), collected around a series of competing 
hypotheses. 
 
Health and Education  
Analysis of the distributional impact of health policy requires crossing data on health status, 
access to, and cost and quality of health services with data on income levels. Relevant over-
time data on groups presumably affected by health interventions (e.g. HIV/AIDS sufferers) 
can in a fairly straightforward way relate the resulting benefits to income levels. In cases 
where specific diseases are attacked (e.g. control of malaria) declining incidence can also be 
easily related to socioeconomic status, as long as the health information is collected with 
appropriate frequency. The impact of more general health services is harder to identify with 
comparable precision. Since health status is a major component of welfare, and varies 
greatly by socio-economic status in many countries, such analysis is an important element 
of thinking about policy on welfare distribution. Recent promising efforts in this area 
include Knaul et al’s (2006) look at the extent to which large (relative to income) health 
expenditures push families into poverty in Mexico and potential for health insurance to 
prevent that outcome; studies of the determinants of the rich-poor gap in child health status 




The effect of educational policies on inequality is an important but difficult research 
question, difficult in part because the effects on economic and more general well-being are 
delayed and more general than those of many health interventions. Economists and others 
have at times held out serious hopes that a better distribution of educational attainment 
could provide a feasible route, perhaps the only feasible route, to a significantly better 
distribution of income in many countries.22 For Latin America, this hope has not been borne 
out, for reasons that need to be analyzed in more detail. Earnings gaps by level of skill have 
risen worldwide over the last couple of decades,23 a pattern more often interpreted as 
reflecting the character of technical change during this period than what has happened or not 
happened on the educational front, though Londoño (1996) and IDB (1997), for example, do 
blame inadequate educational development. It would be surprising if the low and sometimes 
declining quality of primary and sometimes secondary education had not played some role. 
Although Latin America has achieved considerable increases in the coverage of education at 
these two levels, quality has not come along with quantity. Coverage usually comes last to 
the more marginal and hard-to-reach populations. With poorer students, less educational 
background in the home, and greater resistance on the part of teachers to working in these 
zones, it is almost a foregone conclusion that quality of education (as defined by the usual 
objective measures—performance in languages, maths, etc) will be low. Only concerted and 
professional efforts, with the expenditures of relatively large amounts of resources, would 
be likely to reverse this pattern. Such is the background within which data on income 
distribution are used to try to sort out the distributional impacts of various patterns of 
educational advance and reform. The challenge of using the now widely available household 
 
survey data on income distribution to assess the impacts of educational change include, 
together with the universal need to worry about other factors which may be determinants of 
absolute and relative earnings of different people, several special ones: 
i) the need for data on the quality (as well as the quantity) of education of people in 
the sample; data on test scores is now much more widely available than a couple 
of decades ago, but researchers are still sorting out how quality so measured 
relates to the subsequent payoff in economic and other terms; 
ii) the desirability of over time data for individuals, to allow analysis of the age 
profiles of earnings for quality-specific groups; 
iii) the need to deal with the impacts of labor market segmentation in the statistical 
analysis (Rosenzwieg, 2002); 
iv) the continuing challenge of measuring ability and motivation and their 
interactions with educational attainment;24 
v) the lack of any very clear idea of how education pays off, in ways that help to 
understand the earnings gaps by level of education. This is relatively easier when 
the focus is on specific skills and groups like computer operators, but much less 
so when the group is people with primary school engaged in a very wide range of 
activities. 
 
In the cases both of health and education, it is desirable to understand the reasons for non-
access to some services or to a better version of them.  
 
Progress is being made in this challenging area, with a number of recent studies using 
 
microsimulation-based analysis to investigate the impact of educational changes on income 
distribution (e.g. the case studies presented in Bourguignon, Ferreira and Lustig, 2005). This 
approach is probably the most promising at this time, although it will take some time for it 
to be effectively merged with the analysis of how economic structure and macroeconomic 
events and institutional patterns mediate the relationship in question. The increasing 
availability of test scores has given researchers new insights into important policy issues, 
such as the use of vouchers to give parents a greater say in their children’s education and to 
increase competition among suppliers.25 
 
Finance and Financial Reform  
Financial development has been hailed in recent years as an important factor contributing to 
economic growth (Levine, 1997, 2003). The financial reforms which have been undertaken 
as part of the market-friendly reforms are also seen by some as contributing to economic 
equality; analysts have argued, on either theoretical (Balassa et al, 1986, 94) or empirical 
grounds (Jaramillo, Schiantorelli and Weiss, 1993) or both, that ending financial repression 
would improve income distribution by tending to equalize access as between larger, better 
placed firms and smaller ones. It has been difficult to assess this hypothesis empirically, and 
the evidence is, at this point, inconclusive (Berry, 2004). International financial opening is 
more often seen as contributing to inequality by improving the credit access of large 
(international or national) firms relative to that of smaller and more labor-intensive 
competitors (Hawkins, 2000). Burgess and Pande (2003) provide what appears to be the 
most convincing evidence thus far that what one might call the “downward expansion” of 
the banking system to previously underserved regions can reduce inequality, though it must 
 
be noted that the expansion in question was not the result of market forces alone but rather 
what they term the “Indian social banking experiment.”26  
 
Much more attention has been given to microfinance as a poverty-reducing instrument. 
Though it is clear that much of the credit gets to at least fairly low income people, the 
empirical evidence on the magnitude of net social benefits remains scanty. Khandker’s 
(1988) study seems to provide the most solid evidence that the benefit/cost ratio is good for 
the institutions in Bangladesh that he studied. The further step of linking those benefits to 
changes in income distribution has not thus far been taken, to my knowledge. In a few 
countries where the magnitude of microfinance is large enough, including Bangladesh, it 
would be worthwhile to undertake econometric tests of the overall microfinance-income 
distribution links. Otherwise, and this would be the general case in Latin America,27 one 
must fall back on (and in any case should carry out) attempts to trace microcredit benefits 
and costs to those groups most likely affected by them, including non-borrowers. Our 
understanding of the impact on inequality of financial developments along the various paths 
mentioned above will need to rely on a microdata base which allows the analyst to connect 
income levels to interface (both of individuals and of the firms where they work) with the 
financial system. To this end special modules attached to household surveys can be quite 
productive. 
 
Small and Medium Enterprise Policy  
Proponents of a flourishing SME sector argue that it uses generally appropriate technology, 
can achieve good levels of efficiency while at the same time being relatively labor intensive 
 
and thereby contributing to a relatively equitable distribution of income. Though 
comparisons suggest that countries with strong SME sectors suffer lower inequality than 
those with highly dualistic economies (where most of the capital is in the large-scale sector 
and most of the workers in the informal or small scale sector) the needed confirmation that 
size distribution is amenable to policy and that the distributional impact of an increased 
SME share is indeed significantly positive has been hard to marshal, in part because of the 
few examples of a significant shift in size composition towards SMEs. Korea is the most 
cited case, with the SME share, at least in manufacturing, rising dramatically since the mid-
1970s. Nugent and Yhee (2002, 113) noted the timing coincidence for Korea between the 
rapid rise of the SME sector after the mid-1970s and the decrease in inequality. Adelman 
and Robinson (1978) incorporated the size distribution of industry in their modeling 
exercise to study the trends in distribution in the same country. SME has generally played a 
smaller role in Latin America than in many countries of East Asia, and it is urgent to 
understand what its potential is. To this end we need far more empirical analyses of the links 
between size, technology and income distribution, based at least in part on more information 
about the size, technology, and labor productivity of the firms in which individuals work 
and their position in the distribution of income. 
 
Targeting 
Data on income distribution are important, almost by definition, in programs targeted either 
at the poor as a whole or at specific subgroups thereof. Targeting by income level requires 
either data on income itself or, more practically, data on good but simple proxies for 
income. As targeting programs evolve, the nature of the appropriate information base does 
 
as well, calling for a response from those in charge of such information. As is true of 
various of the other policy areas discussed, the need is not so much for more detail on 
incomes and their distribution per se as for more surrounding information, needed in this 
case to provide the useful proxies (characteristics of housing and other assets, health 
conditions, etc.). The experience with targeting in Latin America and elsewhere has, in 
return, enriched our understanding of certain aspects and correlates of poverty, among them 
the dynamics and fluctuations related to the malady. Perhaps more important, the special 
problems of vulnerable groups: single parent families, orphans, and elderly people without 
family support deserve more attention, partly through their identification and study through 
household income and consumption surveys and partly through complementary data, 
including special modules attached to the household surveys. The analysis of poverty must 
be pushed increasingly towards distinctions among the poor according to their 
characteristics and the sources of their poverty. This general need is perhaps especially 
patent in Latin America, where poverty is no longer the norm. Brazil’s rural social security 
system, instituted in the 1990s, provides a safety net for the bulk of former workers in 
agriculture and other primary sector activities and has had a large effect on rural poverty 
levels through a cost of about 1% of GDP (Schwarzer and Querino, 2002; Morley, 2003). It 
exemplifies the importance of group specific poverty policies. Gender inequalities can be 
relatively well described using normal household survey data but getting deeper into both 
the nature of the problem and the mechanisms at work requires a combination of additional 
information (especially on aspects of intrafamily inequality) and panel data to trace 




Privatization has generated much controversy within developing countries; one contentious 
issue is its impact on income distribution and poverty. Outcomes appear to vary widely by 
country, industry involved, and the process (corruption has often worsened the distributional 
impact). Birdsall and Nelllis (2002) conclude that most privatization programs appear to 
have worsened the distribution of assets and income, at least the short run. Jones (2004, 5) 
concludes that “popular opinions on the negative distributional impact of privatization are 
not broadly supported by the available empirical evidence.”28 The difference between these 
two views may reflect that fact that Birdsall and Nellis included in their sample transition 
economies, where negative effects have in some cases been dramatic. Those economies 
aside, the outcome may depend a good deal on the efficiency of the public enterprise vs. the 
private one, and the extent to which the latter will be subject to adequate competition or 
regulation. Good distribution data, linked to evidence on use of services (say electricity, 
water or telephones), can clarify many of the possible impacts on consumers and workers in 
these enterprises. Sometimes the distributional impact turns on whether privatization leads 
to an expansion of the service into lower income areas previously without it (Jones, 2004). 
Loss of jobs is usually unlikely to contribute to poverty since few people in families close to 
the poverty line are employed by public enterprise.  
 
 Summary and Conclusions 
 
Major improvements in the quality and frequency of income and consumption distribution in 
Latin America have provided a useful base for assessing trends and analysing the factors 
 
(including policies) that have an impact on inequality. It seems likely that accuracy is now 
good enough in most countries to pick up significant changes in true inequality (however 
measured) as long as those changes are not concentrated in the components of income or 
consumption which are particularly badly measured—capital income accruing to upper income 
groups (including that from appreciation of assets), or infrequently measured--consumption of 
public goods. Ability to deal with changes in these components of income and consumption 
would require better data and/or a better understanding of when lower quality data sets are 
likely to be decent proxies for higher quality ones. Changes in the real distribution due to 
relative price changes between the consumption baskets of groups at different socio-economic 
levels can be analysed with existing data, though they seldom are, creating another possibly 
significant source of erroneous conclusions on inequality trends. 
 
Arguably the highest potential payoff among the easily feasible improvements to the standard 
data collection procedures is in the panel area. Deaton (1995, 1802) notes the benefits reaped 
from those of the World Bank’s Living Standards Surveys which incorporated that feature.29 
But this is the sort of innovation to the traditional collection procedure that may not last unless 
there is expertise around, inside or outside the data collection agency, to keep it going. 
 
Since the main source for checking on the degree of coverage of income and consumption 
surveys are the national accounts and their component parts, the accuracy of that source may 
constrain improvements in our understanding of distribution as much as do the household 
survey data themselves. Until household surveys are greatly improved from their present 
levels, other types of information will remain the main source on capital income. 
 
 
The third major source of potential improvement is in the information that allows better testing 
of hypotheses about the determination of distribution and its changes. Some of that information 
is quite independent of the distribution data per se (e.g. indicators of market reforms) but much 
needs to be collected together with the distribution data so that it can be used jointly with the 
latter in statistical analysis. Some of what is needed is already collected in most surveys (e.g. 
data on educational level) but most is not (data on educational quality, data on type of firm in 
which the person works). The full range of information that would be useful cannot be 
collected frequently due to cost and limitations on length of interviews. For some analyses, just 
having the data once might answer most of the interesting questions. But often it is important 
to track changes. To that end some sort of rotating special module system is desirable. Some 
countries have something of this sort, but even in the best of cases the total provision of 
information is far below what it would be useful to have. At this point it appears likely that 
extension of the distribution-relevant data base in this direction is the highest priority in many 
countries. Aspiring to decent quality data on capital incomes is optimistic, whereas much 
reliable data helpful in the analysis of important issues can be collected with household 
surveys. Decisions on what to collect and how to do it need to involve the analysts who will be 
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* I have benefited from the comments of two referees of the paper and from participants in 
the workshop. 
1 Thus the 2002 Human Development Report (UNDP, 2002, 194-5) gives a figure of 0.607 
for Brazil (1998) and 0.423 for Uruguay (1989). 
2 The potentially greater accuracy of consumption surveys has led to some cost-cutting 
attempts to measure expenditure through relatively simple questionnaires, but this also 
produces data of generally low quality.  
3 In their base-line estimate, the Gini coefficient rises from the observed 0.450 to 0.508 as a 
result of the correction (Mistiaen and Ravaillon, 2003, 16). 
4 ECLAC has undertaken over the years to present available data in an orderly way and BID 
has invested in improving the data systems. At an earlier stage ECLAC systematically 
compared the expanded household survey income data with the national accounts, and in so 
doing provided much useful feel for the relative completeness of the household survey data 
(e.g. CEPAL, 1987). It did not, nor has anyone else to my knowledge, undertaken 
systematic reviews of the quality of the national accounts (and any other sources used for 
such checks) in Latin America. 
5 At the other end of the spectrum, Rodriguez (2004, 330) suggests that the true Gini 
coefficient in Venezuela during the 1990s was above 0.60, even though that for labor 
incomes was around 0.4. (For this period most of the reported Gini coefficients for 
household income were in the mid to high 40s, according to the WIDER database on 
inequality.) His contention is that due inclusion of capital income would increase the Gini 
 
                                                                                                                                                     
coefficient by much more than the six percentage points constituting the upper end of the 
range reported by Altimir. In allocating his estimate of capital income to individuals he uses 
the same procedure cited above—assuming the same degree of underreporting of such 
income for all those who reported any.  
6 Berry (1987, 424) used the few cases for which two comparable figures were available to 
conclude that the ratio of Gini coefficients of consumption inequality tended to fall in the 
range 0.85-0.90 as high as the corresponding ones for income. Thus if the coefficient for 
income was about 0.5 a reasonable estimate of that for consumption would be 0.43-0.45. 
Some cross-country regressions to explain inequality have included a dummy variable to 
distinguish income from consumption data, reaching the same conclusion. De Ferranti et al 
(2003, 48-49) refer to the analysis by Elbers et al (2003) in which a small 1996 pilot survey 
in parts of Brazil was used to estimate the national Gini for consumption, giving the 
conclusion that, at something under 0.5, it was far below the Gini for household per capita 
income of 0.6.  
7 If, for example, a group of farmers had not received subsidized credit, the price of their 
product might have been higher, hence their nominal income higher, and so on. In the 
absence of implausibly sophisticated general equilibrium models, such analyses are seldom 
carried out. 
8 A comparable problem arises when someone in a family makes choices on the 
consumption basket on behalf of the whole family. Where the chooser suffers inadequate 
information, as to the tastes of some family members, this constitutes misinformation. Some 
intra-family decisions, though against the preference of the consumer, are good ones since 
 
                                                                                                                                                     
the selector knows what is good for the consumer better than does the latter. The same issue 
arises in government selection of levels and contents of public goods; the government may 
know either less well or better than the consumer what is good for him/her. 
9 I am indebted to Luis Beccaria for this observation. 
10 Canada’s Centre for the Study of Living Standards has supported a number of studies on 
the implications of economic insecurity, e.g. the rising impermanent of jobs (e.g. Osberg, 
1998; Sharpe, 2002). 
11 In an interesting study Neri and Thomas (2000) use Brazil’s rotating panel design to 
analyze vulnerability to shocks and worker response. Studies of employment and poverty 
mobility have used the panels in Argentina, Costa Rica, Peru and Mexico.  
12 Paglin (1975) did the first major empirical study of this for the U.S. 
13 Defining wealth inequality is as complicated or more so than defining income inequality. 
The broadest definitions might include not only all obvious forms of private wealth (land, 
real estate, financial assets, consumer durables) but also occupational pension rights, state 
pension rights (old-age pension, etc.) and even human capital. Sometimes consumer 
durables are excluded, as are state pension rights, and human capital is to my knowledge 
never actually included. For a useful discussion see Davies and Shorrocks (2000). 
14 See, for example, Ferriera et al (2003) for Brazil. Godi et al (2005) present a good review 
of price deflation across social groups. 
15 This is presumably due in part to unhappy people having trouble finding jobs but 
longitudinal studies by psychologists have demonstrated that this is not the only cause 
(Oswald, 1997, 1822). 
 
                                                                                                                                                     
16 Rising average income does not appear to lead to anything like commensurate increases 
in average happiness. There is a significant cross-section relationship between happiness 
and income, but it is far from overwhelming. In the European data for 1975-86, 18.8% of 
the bottom quintile report being "very happy" compared with 28.4% for the top one, while 
26.7% report being "not too happy" compared with 13.1% for the top quintile (Di Tella et 
al, 1996). Part of this correlation would be due to the higher unemployment rates of the 
lower income groups. Over time the happiness of the unemployed shows much more 
fluctuation than that of the employed, for reasons as yet unexplained.  
17 Though the results of Graham and Felton (2005), discussed below, do not point in this 
direction for Latin America, possibly because most of the countries are in the middle-
income range. 
18 The use of more than one measure simultaneously calls for a multi-dimensional approach, 
discussed by Bourguignon and Chakravarty (2003). 
19 The set of studies reported by Bulmer-Thomas (1996) points in this direction as well. 
20 A serious flaw in many analyses in this area has been lack of attention to which index of 
trade reform to use, and to the relatively low correlation among some of the candidates 
(Pritchett, 1996).  
21 Property rights reform may increase the concentration of land if liquidity-constrained 
farms are induced to sell to those already wealthier agents with access to credit (Carter and 
Olinto, 2003). 
22 This hope was probably borne in part of desperation, as the belief solidified that income 
and consumption distribution are largely determined by the distribution of income-
 
                                                                                                                                                     
producing assets (broadly defined), that land distribution could not be tampered with much 
due to the political resistance that attempts at land reform would face and have faced in 
Latin America, and that it is unrealistic to expect the distribution of non-agricultural capital 
to be anything but quite concentrated (as it tends to be in all capitalist countries). This left 
only human capital as a factor of production whose distribution could presumably be 
affected by public policy (that distribution is not highly concentrated in countries with 
relatively equitable income distribution, like Taiwan, but is highly concentrated in countries 
at the other end of the inequality spectrum, like Brazil) and which affects a substantial share 
of total income (since the labor share, including imputed labor income of the self-employed 
appears to be above 60% in nearly all countries). 
23 In Chile, for example, whereas private returns to primary and secondary education were at 
12% in 1970 and to higher education 18%, by 1997 the former rates were unchanged but the 
higher had risen to 25% (Contreras et al, 1998, cited by Mizala and Romaguera, 2000). 
24 Early studies on the role of ability include Boissiere, Knight and Sabot (1985), 
Psacharopoulos and Vélez (1992) 
25 In an interesting test of the effects of Chile’s pioneering voucher system, whereby private 
subsidized schools have been allowed to compete with municipal (public) schools since the 
early 1980s, Mizala and Romaguera (2000, 409) report that, though the former outperform 
the latter in terms of average student scores when no other determinants of scores are taken 
into account, when such variables are added to the regressions the gap between subsidized 
private and municipal schools is small or nonexistent. Private fee-paying institutions 
continue to outperform the other two groups of schools, explicable by the higher level of 
 
                                                                                                                                                     
inputs to the educational process that case. 
26 In 1977 the central bank of India, with a view to reducing regional differences in financial 
development and in income, instituted a rule whereby in order to open a branch in an 
already banked location a public commercial bank had to open four branches in unbanked 
locations. The authors conclude that the bulk of the very considerable rural bank expansion 
which followed was the result of this policy. They also report (Burgess and Pande, 2003,12) 
that rural poverty reduction was more rapid in financially more developed states both before 
1977 and after 1990 (when the program was ended) but that pattern was reversed between 
those two years. 
27 Westley (2001) discusses the impact of financial market policies, microcredit and credit 
unions on inequality in Latin America. 
28 An interesting recent study by Galiani et al (2005) finds that in districts where water was 
privatized in Argentina in the 1990s child mortality fell overall by 8% (relative to districts 
where it was not) and the impact was largest (26%) in the poorest areas. This impact came 
through the reduction of water-related diseases. 
29 See also Rosenzweig, 2003. 
